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As revealed during the debate on the 
formulation of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), a challenge is 
emerging against the currently dominant 
view of development, which focuses on 
poverty reduction and individual 
empowerment, while leaving economic 
growth largely to the market. A number of 
scholars have denounced this view, 
reflected especially in the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), for its 
neglect of structural change, inequality, 
and employment (Gore, 2010; Khan and 
Christiansen, 2011; Chang, 2011). 
Especially in the last years of her life, 
Alice Amsden was at the forefront of this 
challenge, showing how employment 
creation and improvement in job quality 
via learning-based industrialisation is the 
only pathway to truly inclusive and 
sustainable development (Amsden 2010, 
2012).  
The present article tries to develop an 
alternative to the current development 
orthodoxy by building on Alice Amsden’s 
seminal work. In Section 2, we critically 
examine the currently dominant view of 
development, based on Neoclassical 
economic theory while incorporating 
elements of Amartya Sen’s Capability 
Approach. In section 3, we present the 
main building blocks for a New 
Developmentalist perspective. 
Development is conceptualised as a 
process of production transformation, led 
by the expansion of collective capabilities 
and resulting in the creation of good 
quality jobs and sustainable structural 
change. In Section 4, based on this New 
Developmentalist vision, we propose a 
more holistic view of sustainable 
development that can reconcile the social, 
economic and environmental dimensions.  
 
Why and how has the dominant 
development discourse come to neglect 




Over the last century, the development 
discourse has produced two main views. In 
the aftermath of World War II and the de-
colonisation process, we saw the 
ascendancy of classical development 
theories (Prebisch, 1950; Lewis, 1954; 
Myrdal, 1957; Hirschman, 1958), in which 
development was almost synonymous with 
industrialisation and structural 
transformation. They focused on the need 
for high capital accumulation and the 
transformation of productive structure 
through economic planning, 
conceptualised in terms of aggregate 
variables, like savings, investments, and 
surplus labour. The developmental state 
and the large industrial companies 
operating in oligopolistic markets were 
seen as the main entrepreneurial agents 
behind such transformation. In applying 
these theories, individuals were forgotten 
and, worse, repressed in the name of a 
greater good called economic development.  
From the 1970s, classical development 
economics came under severe challenge, 
first from resurgent Neoclassical 
economics and then from the ‘humanist’ 
approaches, represented by Sen’s 
capability approach. Today, a combination 
of these two approaches form the dominant 
view of development. In this section, we 
offer a critical appraisal of this view, in 
order to lay the groundwork for an 
alternative perspective we offer in the next 
section.  
Standard Neoclassical economics 
and its limitations    
Amsden (1997, p. 469) pointed out that 
classical development theories were 
“firmly and fundamentally rooted in 
production” and emphasised the central 
role that “innovative divisions of labor, 
constrained by market size” play in 
development. While acknowledging 
“flirtations with production-related issues” 
of some mainstream theories, Amsden 
(1997, p. 470) accused Neoclassical 
economists of having increasingly 
interpreted markets “exclusively in terms 
of exchange rather than production, as in 
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the new institutionalism, according to 
which growth is retarded by high 
transaction costs (why not high production 
costs?); or international trade studies 
which emphasise the importance of 
relative exchange prices between domestic 
and foreign sales, ignoring how a capacity 
to produce tradables for sale in any market 
arises”. 
The neglect of production denounced by 
Amsden is not incidental. It is due to the 
core premises of Neoclassical economics. 
The most relevant ones are: (i) the fixation 
with market exchange and the 
corresponding ‘black box’ view of 
production; (ii) the limited understanding 
of technological and organisational 
learning in production; (iii) the production 
homogeneity assumption (namely, the 
assumption that all production activities 
are alike); (iv) the atomistic society 
assumption; and, finally (v) the pro-
consumer bias. 
First, Neoclassical economics has 
traditionally assigned prominence to the 
phenomenon of exchange between rational 
individuals in the market and the related 
problem of allocative efficiency of scarce 
resources (Simon, 1991; Pasinetti, 2007). 
Given this, it has no real theory of 
production. Even in the so-called theory of 
production, production is conceptualised 
as isomorphic to consumption within a 
framework of rational choice and 
competitive equilibrium (Loasby, 1999). 
Production functions represent a set of 
efficient techniques, defined as 
combinations of factor inputs that produce 
the maximum amount of outputs. These 
functions are used both at the micro level 
(to derive the cost functions of a firm) and 
the macro level (to determine factor 
income shares and relative contributions to 
economic growth). Despite the fact that 
“for no other branch of economics is the 
concept of process as essential as for the 
economics of production” (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1970, p. 2), Neoclassical theory 
has maintained a ‘black box’ view of 
production, in which organisational 
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dynamics and technological learning over 
time are ignored (Rosenberg, 1982 and 
1994; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Andreoni 
and Scazzieri, 2013; Andreoni, 2014).  
Second, Neoclassical economics has a 
limited understanding of technological and 
organisational learning in production. 
While concepts like ‘learning by doing’, 
‘technical change’ and ‘human capital’ 
have been gradually introduced, they are 
theorised in rather simplistic ways. For 
example, the concept of learning by doing 
(Arrow, 1962) may capture the Smithian 
idea that worker productivity increases 
with production experiences, but it does so 
in a dis-embedded way, that is, with no 
reference to the structure and the process 
of production and only in terms of the 
sheer length of time spent in the execution 
of tasks. For another example, in the so-
called human capital theory, human capital 
is conceptualised as a homogenous input, 
despite the fact that real-life production 
happens in firms that use different 
combination of “appropriate knowledge, 
experience and skills”, rather than 
undifferentiated knowledge (Richardson 
1972). Moreover, Neoclassical theory sees 
human capital as something that is 
accumulated outside the production 
process as a result of formal education, 
when often more important is the 
accumulation of capabilities through 
learning in production (Best, 1990; 
Lazonick, 1990; Andreoni, 2014).  
Third, Neoclassical economics vastly 
under-estimates the heterogeneity of 
production activities within and across 
production sectors. Not only does it ignore 
the issue of “what” (i.e., the product) you 
produce “how” (i.e., technologies and 
organisations used), it does not consider 
the question of “where” the production is 
conducted:  “The general assumption is 
that production functions are everywhere 
identical so that the most labor-intensive 
commodities are indisputably the 
comparative advantage of the lowest-wage 
producers”, which in reality is not the case 
(Amsden, 1991, p. 283).  
6 
 
Fourth, Neoclassical economics has a poor 
understanding of the “who” aspect of 
production (Richardson, 1972; Lazonick, 
2010). The framing of the economy as a 
series of transactions between individuals 
prevents it from understanding the 
collective nature of production. As 
highlighted by Herbert Simon (1991, p.25), 
“as soon as firms are elaborated to become 
more than simple nodes in a network of 
transactions, to be producers—
transformers of factors into products—
difficult and important questions arise for 
the theory. A large part of the behavior of 
the system now takes place inside the skins 
of firms, and does not consist just of 
market exchanges”.  
Fifth, Neoclassical economics has 
traditionally conceptualised individuals as 
insatiable consumers, continuously 
seeking to maximise utility by gaining 
more goods and services. Work is seen as 
purely instrumental in securing 
consumption and a form of disutility in 
that it is painful and limits individual’s 
leisure time (Chang, 2014; Spencer, 2015). 
Within this framework, economic growth 
is seen as the main vehicle for increasing 
individual income, which expands 
consumption and thus enhances human 
well-being. Consequently, poverty is 
mainly understood (and measured) as a 
form of consumption deprivation.  
Beyond or Within Neoclassical 
Economics?: Modifications to 
standard Neoclassical economics 
and their limits   
Neoclassical economics has experienced 
some modifications in the last few decades. 
Starting from the mid-1970s, it has started 
to recognise the problems associated with 
asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970; 
Spence, 1973; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 
1986; Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2013).  
From the 1980s, Neoclassical economists 
working in the tradition of New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) have 
developed an explanation of the existence 
of the firm, using the concept of 
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transaction costs (Williamson, 1981; North, 
1990).  
Important they may have been, these 
advancements are still within the 
Neoclassical paradigm. The focuses of 
information economics remain to be 
resource allocation, market exchange, and 
consumption. Even the NIE theory of the 
firm, which inevitably pays more attention 
to the issue of production, does not amount 
to a full theory of production in that it 
neglects the collective and political 
processes in which resource are 
continuously developed and organised in 
production within and between firms.  
In parallel, the development discourse 
witnessed the emergence of humanistic 
perspectives from the 1970s, starting with 
the ‘basic needs’ approach (Streeten, 1979) 
and the view that ‘small is beautiful’, that 
is, the view that development programme 
should be bottom-up and focused on micro 
and capillary interventions (Schumacher, 
1973).  The humanist approach was 
boosted by the emergence of Sen’s 
Capability Approach (CA) in the 1980s, 
which gained influence in the 1990s (Sen, 
1985, 1999). The CA challenged the 
standard Neoclassical view of welfare 
based on utility-based measures and its 
reductionist way of thinking about utility 
as the result of income or commodity 
endowments. The CA proposed a view of 
development as expansion of freedoms, or 
valued ‘beings and doings’. As later 
pointed out by Sen (1997), in contrast to 
the BLAST (‘blood, sweat and tears’) view 
of development of classical development 
economistsi, the CA advanced the GALA – 
‘getting by with a little assistance’ – view 
of development, giving justifications for 
what Amsden (2012, p. 114) later called  
“grass roots poverty alleviation measures”. 
Even while it criticises Neoclassical 
economics for its exclusive focus on 
material consumption, the CA shares some 
fundamental outlooks with it. First, it is an 
individualist approach, like Neoclassical 
economics, and thus neglects the collective 
dimensions of the economy (Gore, 1997; 
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Evans, 2002; Jackson, 2005). In criticising 
Sen for being still a ‘good Manchester 
liberal’, Evans (2002, p. 56) draws 
attention to the fact that “my ability to 
choose the life I have reason to value often 
hangs on the possibility of my acting 
together with others who have reason to 
value similar things” and concludes that 
“individual capabilities depend on 
collective capabilities”. Second, the CA 
shares with Neoclassical economics a 
consumption-based view of human welfare 
as it focuses more on the use of resources 
than on their creation, even though it 
defines consumption more broadly. This 
makes it neglect the role of production in 
the economy and the possibility of 
conceptualising individuals as producers. 
Third, these two characteristics, when 
combined, make the CA neglect the issue 
of collective productive capabilities (what 
Amsden defined as ‘social construction of 
competitive assets’; see below), and 
underestimate the importance of changing 
a country’s productive structure as the 
most fundamental dimension of 
development.  
The result has been an unintended and 
usually unacknowledged alliance between 
Neoclassical economics and the CA 
approach since the 1990s. Development 
and poverty reduction have become 
synonymous and the critical role of 
productive transformation has been 
neglected. This has also led to the neglect 
of full and productive employment as a 
critical dimension of development (this 
goal was recognised within the MDGs 
only in 2007; van der Hoeven, 2014). 
Moreover, the individualist bias of the 
dominant approach has meant that primary 
education, health and empowerment have 
occupied the centre stage in development 
discourse, as reflected in the MDGs, while 
individualist poverty reduction schemes, 
such as microfinance or conditional cash 
transfers, have been promoted as 
‘development’ policies (Amsden, 2009, 
2010, 2012; Chang, 2011).  
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Real world consequences  
The neglect of production and employment 
by Neoclassical economics is not just an 
academic problem. It has had pervasive 
negative effects on real world development 
policies. 
First, as Amsden (1997, p. 470) 
highlighted, given its focus on markets and 
its neglect of production, Neoclassical 
economics sees development as “an 
unqualified process of reducing market 
failures”. However, she argues, “in terms 
of production, it is a process of building 
and buttressing [market failures]” in the 
sense that many market failures are the 
manifestations of a dynamic 
transformation in the sphere of production, 
which is at the source of economic 
development. For example, monopolies are 
often the results of innovation, but if we 
see them as a market failure to be 
‘corrected’, as in Neoclassical economics, 
we are likely to implement policies that 
dampen the dynamism of the economy. 
Indeed, developing countries have been 
increasingly urged to implement 
American-style competition policy, which 
does not discriminate between monopolies 
that come from innovation and those that 
come from predatory behaviour (Amsden 
and Singh, 1994). 
Second, the Neoclassical view of 
production as a simple process of 
combining non-specialised factors of 
production according to fully known and 
easily transferrable formulae has had 
important impacts on both trade and 
industrial policies. As productive 
capabilities are assumed to be the same in 
all countries, there is no justification for 
infant industry protection, which creates 
the space within which developing country 
producers with lower productive 
capabilities can invest in raising their 
capabilities (Lin and Chang, 2009).  
Moreover, the failure to recognise the 
specialised nature of factor inputs across 
industries has given credence to the 
currently popular – but mistaken – view 
10 
 
that industrial policy, even if it is used, 
should be ‘horizontal’ – that is, it should 
concentrate on increasing the supply of 
production factors that all industries use, 
rather than provide selective supports for 
particular industries, firms, or technologies 
(Andreoni, 2016).  
Third, the Neoclassical assumption of  
production homogeneity has also 
supported the view that what countries 
produce does not matter; “It doesn’t matter 
whether you produce potato chips or 
micro-chips”, to borrow a famous 
expression from the 1980s industrial 
policy debate in the USii. This has, in turn, 
made a lot of developing countries 
complacent about their dependence on 
primary commodities, cheap assembly, or 
low-grade services. However, in the long 
run, different economic activities give 
different scope for growth and 
technological development, so even from a 
purely growth-oriented point of view, the 
assumption of production homogeneity has 
negative policy implications.  
Fourth, the Neoclassical neglect of the 
collective dimensions of productive 
capabilities has led to the atrophy of many 
institutions that are important in 
developing productive capabilities: capital-
labour collaboration within firms; 
cooperation among firms within and across 
sectors; government-business interactions, 
including, but not just, industrial policy; 
partnership between industry, public 
technology intermediaries, and the 
academia (Amsden, 1989, 2001; Pisano 
and Shih, 2009; Berger, 2013; Andreoni, 
2016; Andreoni, et al. 2017).  
Fifth, the neglect of production has created 
a pro-consumer bias in policy assessment. 
Neoclassical economics conceptualizes 
human beings mainly as individualistic 
consumers, rather than workers that are 
parts of social division of labour and in 
whose life work is not just a source of 
disutility but also sources of identity, self-
respect, self-realisation, and solidarity. The 
resulting policy package has been what 
Amsden called the ‘grassroots’ methods of 
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poverty alleviation, relying on 
enhancement of individual capabilities and 
the encouragement of their utilization 
through measures like micro-credit and 
cash transfers (Amsden, 2012). In her last 
contributions, Amsden (2009, 2010, 2012) 
criticized this view for being a version of 
Say’s Law, which mistakenly believes 
that, when we improve the capabilities of 
job seekers, new jobs requiring higher 
capabilities will be created in response and 
production will be smoothly transformed.  
 
Towards a New Developmentalist 
Framework:Production Transformation 
and  the Creation of Good Jobs   
In this section, we introduce a theoretical 
framework in which development is re-
conceptualised as a process of production 
transformation, which is essential for 
creating good employment. In doing so, 
we are not trying to go back to the older 
aggregate approach solely focused on 
resource mobilization and labour 
absorption but combining those old 
insights with the more recent theoretical 
developments on industrialisation via 
learning, shop-floor-level micro-efficiency, 
and what Amsden called ‘social 
construction of competitive assets’.  
Production transformation: The 
constitutive role of production 
and the “social constructions of 
competitive assets”   
Human capabilities and production 
capabilities are hardly separable. This does 
not mean that they are one and the same. 
There are a number of valued ‘beings’ and 
‘doings’, as described in the Sen’s CA, 
that are not immediately related to 
production (Sen, 1999). However, 
production activities take an 
extraordinarily large part of human beings’ 
life. Those capabilities (and freedoms) that 
human beings develop (or fail to develop) 
in production are integral parts of human 
capabilities expansion.  
Production capabilities are defined here as 
personal and collective knowledge that are 
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needed for the execution of production 
tasks and for the improvements in 
technological and organisational functions 
of production units (Penrose, 1959; 
Richardson, 1972; Amsden, 1997; 
Andreoni, 2014). While education and off-
the-job training play important roles in 
their developments, these capabilities 
mainly develop through processes of 
learning in production within firms. 
Moreover, it is within the realm of 
production that human beings develop 
their identity as producers. This is also the 
reason why Classical Political Economists 
were extremely concerned about the 
positive as well as the negative effects of 
the more minute division of labour within 
factories on workers. Adam Smith 
supported public education as a means to 
counter the mental de-gradation of workers 
confined to simple, repetitive tasks, while 
Karl Marx argued that in factories workers 
are reduced to “living appendages” to 
“lifeless mechanism”. 
One dimension that is often neglected even 
by those who share Smith’s and Marx’s 
concern is the inevitably collective nature 
of the production process. Since the advent 
of the industrial revolution, ever-
developing division of labour (DOL) has 
made production an increasingly collective 
process. Even self-employed individual 
producers rely on the existence of a dense 
network of interdependences among 
producers. This interdependence can be 
seen at the level of the single production 
units (DOL at the shop floor level or 
within vertically-integrated firms), groups 
of production units (DOL at the cluster 
level or in local or national production 
networks) and at the level of production 
units distributed worldwide (DOL in 
global production networks). 
To go one step further, and borrowing 
from Ricoeur (1992), we can define 
production structures as one of the most 
important ‘structures of living together’ in 
human society. Their relevance for 
development is not simply instrumental – 
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i.e. being the main places in which 
material wealth is created. Productive 
structures are complex social organisations 
whose functioning depends on various 
forms of co-operation. Moreover, the set of 
collective capabilities that workers develop 
in production units are not reducible to any 
individual human beings involved in the 
process. As language is an irreducible 
social good, production routines and 
organisational capabilities are intrinsically 
valuable systemic properties of 
communities (Abramovitz, 1995; 
Andreoni, 2014).  
The idea of production as a collective 
process also leads us to acknowledge how 
human beings do not simply coordinate 
their productive efforts but also 
continuously experience processes of 
collective and cumulative learning. In 
Amsden’s Late-Industrializing Model (or 
LIM) (Amsden 1989, 1991, 2001; Amsden 
and Hikino, 1994), processes of collective 
learning within productive enterprises 
(whereby production engineering and 
project execution capabilities are 
developed by producing and then 
remembered by doing) were considered 
the main factors leading to highest levels 
of micro-efficiency and long cycles of 
sustained competitiveness among the East 
Asian ‘miracle’ economies (Amsden, 
1991, pp. 283-4).  
According to Amsden, in successful cases 
of LIM, “[g]overnments’ role has been one 
of joining with the private sector to 
socially construct competitive assets 
(resources, capabilities and organisations) 
rather than to create perfect markets” 
(Amsden 1997, p. 478; italics added). 
First, it has provided technology 
infrastructure in the forms of public 
technology consultancy services, aimed at 
helping producers absorb foreign 
technologies, reach higher product 
standards, and acquire better management 
techniques and practices. Second, it has 
used disciplined and conditional subsidies 
for export promotion, which is integrated 
with the strategy of infant industry 
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promotion. Third, it has orchestrated 
sectoral developments and inter-sectoral 
transitions. Fourth, it has been engaged in 
smart circumvention of increasingly 
restrictive international regulations of 
industrial policy measures (e.g., WTO 
restrictions on the regulation of FDI). As a 
result of these policies, “the state 
transformed the process of economic 
development and, in turn, was transformed 
by it” (Amsden 1991, p. 286).  
Another reason why production 
transformation plays a constitutive role in 
a country’s development is that it shapes 
the country’s institutional, social and even 
ideological changes. Simon Kuznets 
spelled out this argument explicitly in 
various passages of his work among which 
the following is worth particular attention:  
“If technology is to be employed 
efficiently, … institutional and ideological 
adjustments must be made to effect the 
proper use of innovations generated by the 
advancing stock of human knowledge. To 
cite examples from modern economic 
growth: steam and electric power and the 
large-scale plants needed to exploit them 
are not compatible with family enterprise, 
illiteracy, or slavery… Nor is modern 
technology compatible with the rural mode 
of life, the large and extended family 
pattern, and veneration of undisturbed 
nature…. Thus, not only are high 
aggregate growth rates associated with 
rapid changes in economic structure, but 
the latter are also associated with rapid 
changes in other aspects of society – in 
family formation, in urbanization, in man's 
views on his role and the measure of his 
achievement in society” (Kuznets, 1973, 
pp. 247-250; italics added). 
 
The interplay between techno-industrial 
changes, on the one hand, and institutional, 
social and ideological changes, on the 
other hand, means that production 
structures and their transformation will not 
simply play an instrumental role in the 
development process, that is, creating the 
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material basis for better human conditions. 
By constituting and re-constituting 
individuals through their work experiences 
and by influencing the ways in which 
institutions and ideologies evolve, 
production structures affect the processes 
through which societies develop their own 
ideas of human development and 
freedoms. In other words, the content and 
the scope of human development, that is, 
the individual capabilities and freedoms 
that societies value, do not exist 
independently of their societies. They are 
historically determined and socially 
recognised as a result of the process of 
structural transformation, mainly 
consisting of changes in production 
structures. 
 
The structural heterogeneity of 
production and the special 
properties of manufacturing 
Emphasising the importance of production 
in the development process is only the first 
step in the construction of a New 
Developmentalist framework. We need 
also to recognise and analyse the structural 
heterogeneity of production and the 
resulting qualitative differences between 
different patterns of economic growth 
(Hirschman, 1958). In Neoclassical 
economics, the only differences among 
production activities or sectors are due to 
different factor proportions that are used. 
However, as Amsden (1991, p. 283) noted, 
“factor proportions, the pillar of 
[Neoclassical] price theory, does not 
capture the dynamics of industrial change”. 
Real world production is characterised by 
structural heterogeneities. First of all, the 
same product can be produced in different 
ways – in other words, there is process 
heterogeneity even for the same product. 
Second, different production activities 
exhibit very different internal dynamics 
and external impacts – in other words, 
there is heterogeneity across products and 
sectors. 
First, even for the apparently same product, 
different production units might be 
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organised with a view to obtain different 
product characteristics to fulfil different 
needs, such as different physical attributes 
or different product quality (Lancaster 
1966). Product customisation or re-
engineering of products with reduced 
functioning are such examples.   
Second, even when they produce the same 
product, each production unit might use 
technologies that employ different 
combinations of factors (Stewart, 1972), as 
also recognised in Neoclassical economics. 
For example, the same production process 
can rely on more or less automated steps.   
Third, even when the same factor 
proportion is used at the aggregate level, 
factors of production are heterogeneous in 
the sense that the same “resources” (e.g. 
technology systems, production equipment, 
skilled people, organisational systems) can 
provide different “services”, according to 
the way in which they are deployed and 
combined in the actual production process 
(Penrose, 1959). For example, the 
productivity and the creativity of the same 
worker may change dramatically under 
different organisational conditions.  
Fourth, only a limited set of organisational 
and technological configurations are 
feasible for each product, given the 
existence of “vertical constraints”. This 
means that the decision to produce a 
particular type of intermediate product 
with a particular technology at one stage of 
production constrains the nature of the 
previous and the subsequent stages 
(Andreoni, 2014).  
Fifth, as pointed out by Amsden (1977, p. 
217) in her study of the Taiwanese 
machine tools industry, each production 
unit’s choices (along the above-mentioned 
dimensions) are limited (or enabled) by the 
size and the composition of the market 
(“average income or individual consuming 
units” or, more precisely, the income 
distribution among the consuming units).  
As for the issue of product-sector 
heterogeneity, the most important idea is 
that manufacturing has special properties, 
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as emphasised by Kaldor (1967) and 
Hirschman (1958). 
Firstly, in manufacturing, there are greater 
opportunities for mechanisation and 
chemical processing, which make 
productivity increase easier. Productivity 
increase in agriculture is highly 
constrained by nature in terms of time, 
space, soil, and climate. By their very 
nature, many service activities are 
inherently impervious to productivity 
increases. In some cases, the very increase 
in productivity will destroy the product 
itself; if a string quartet trots through a 27-
minute piece in nine minutes, we won’t 
say that its productivity has trebled. For 
some other services, the apparently higher 
productivity may be due to the de-
basement of the product; retail services or 
financial services in the recent period are 
the best examples (Chang, 2010).  
Second, because of its ability to produce 
productive inputs for other sectors (e.g., 
machines, chemicals), the manufacturing 
sector has extremely important impacts on 
the productivity growth of other sectors 
(Rosenberg, 1982, 1994; Amsden, 1977). 
The increases in agricultural productivity 
that we have seen in the last century and 
half would not have been possible without 
the developments of manufacturing 
industries producing agricultural 
machinery, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, 
and increasingly genetically modified 
organisms. The rapid increases in the 
productivity of services like logistics and 
retail recently have been made possible by 
manufacturing industries producing more 
efficient transport equipment, computers, 
and mechanised warehouses.  
Third, productivity growth has been driven 
not just by technological changes but also 
organizational changes, most of which 
have originated in the manufacturing 
sector. For example, large retail chains – 
be they supermarkets, clothes shop chains, 
or on-line retailers – apply modern 
inventory management techniques, 
developed in the manufacturing sector. 
Even in agriculture, productivity has been 
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raised in some countries through the 
application of manufacturing-style 
organisational knowledge, like computer-
controlled feeding (the Dutch agriculture is 
the prime example).  
Fourth, manufacturing also plays a special 
role in creating demands for other sectors, 
especially for the high-productivity sub-
sectors. For example, most of the service 
activities that have high productivity and 
have seen high productivity growths 
recently – sometimes even faster than 
those of some sub-sectors of 
manufacturing (e.g., finance, transport, and 
business services) – are ‘producer’ 
services, whose main customers are 
manufacturing firms. Of course, countries 
can specialise in those services, but in 
many producer services (especially 
engineering, design, management 
consulting), their ability to export cannot 
be maintained in the long run without a 
strong manufacturing sector, as insights 
gained from the production process and the 
continuous interaction between the service 
provider and the clients are crucial for 
those services. Given this, a weakening 
manufacturing base will eventually lead to 
a decline in the quality, and the 
exportability, of those services (Pisano and 
Shih, 2012; Berger, 2013; Chang, 2014).  
Finally, the manufacturing sector, 
producing physical and non-perishable 
products, has higher tradability than 
agriculture and, especially, services. Given 
this, a rising share of services in the 
economy means that the country, other 
things being equal, will have lower export 
earnings. Moreover, many of today’s 
manufactured products are ‘product 
systems’ supporting the provision of a 
wide range of high-value customised 
services  (e.g. typically ‘smart’ products, 
such as smartphones and cars but also 
modern production machines). Given this, 
when they lose manufacturing capacity, 
countries  lose the ability to export those 
services that require those manufactured 
products that act as ‘product systems’ for 
them. In other words, manufactured 
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products are crucial even for increasing the 
tradability of certain services (Tassey, 
2007). 
More and better jobs  
Bringing production back into the 
development discourse also implies a 
fundamental refocusing of the debate from 
poverty reduction to employment creation 
and improvements in working conditions. 
In this regard, Amsden (2012, p. 114) 
stressed the limitations of today’s 
development debate as follows: “Poverty 
is caused by unemployment, owing to a 
scarcity of jobs that pay above bare 
subsistence, but grass roots poverty 
alleviation measures are exclusively 
designed to make job-seekers more 
capable although no jobs are available. 
The appropriate technologies of the grass 
roots movement that dominates anti-
poverty policies are oriented towards 
consumption, ignoring production jobs”.  
By challenging the mainstream 
conceptualisation of poverty, Amsden 
drew our attention to the causal 
mechanism going from unemployment to 
poverty and stressed the self-defeating 
nature of those development policies that 
expand education in the absence of 
expansion and transformation of the 
productive sectors. As she pointed out, 
such attempts have led to educated people 
taking up jobs for which they are over-
qualified and to ‘brain drain’ from the 
economically less developed regions and 
countries to the more developed ones. 
From Amsden’s perspective, then, 
poverty-reduction policies and education 
policies have to go hand in hand with 
policies promoting production 
transformation (ILO, 2014). 
A New Developmentalist paradigm needs 
to bring employment back in, in terms of 
both the quantity and the quantity of jobs. 
The re-conceptualisation of development 
as a cumulative process of production 
transformation, accompanied by the 
creation of more and better jobs, poses a 
fundamental challenge to the mainstream 
20 
 
view of work, namely the view that the 
quality of jobs is simply determined by its 
material rewards (wages plus other 
material benefits, such as pension 
schemes, health insurance, and education 
subsidies for children).  
Fortunately, in the last couple of decades, 
there have developed a number of ‘decent 
job / job quality’ frameworks. For the most 
prominent example, since 1999, the ILO 
has promoted a ‘Decent Work’ framework 
(and indicators) aimed at promoting 
opportunities for decent and productive 
work in conditions of freedom, equity, 
security and dignity. More recently, 
Korner et al. (2009) have introduced a 
seven-layer model of quality of 
employment, including material rewards 
(e.g. income and other material benefits), 
intellectual rewards (e.g. skills 
development and training, workplace 
motivation, social dialogues), and the 
physical, intellectual, and emotional 
demands of the job (e.g. working hours 
and life-work balance; security of 
employment) (see Burchell et al. 2014 for 
a review). 
Combining these contributions with 
Amsden’s legacy and our theory of 
production transformation, a New 
Developmentalist framework should  
consider not just the material reward of 
employment but also three other 
dimensions – the physical efforts and the 
intellectual efforts that work demands of 
the worker and the intellectual-emotional 
rewards that workers gain from it.  All of 
these are affected by the process of 
development. 
The physical effort of work is determined 
by factors like the specific type of tasks 
workers have to perform, the way in which 
tasks are organised, and the extent to 
which the pace of work is determined by 
the pace of the machine they are working 
with. In the development process, this 
dimension is usually (although not always) 
improved through technological change 
and production upgrading. In many 
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industries, modern production 
technologies and machinery have 
substituted humans in the execution of the 
most physically demanding and repetitive 
tasks. Advances in the quality of the 
material used and of the machinery used to 
process it has created a healthier and safer 
working environment. Of course, the 
introduction of machinery involves a 
trade-off between  productivity growth and  
job creation. However, while this means a 
structural unemployment problem in the 
short- to medium term, the acceptance and 
management of this trade-off is a 
necessary condition for the development of 
any economy.  
While reducing the physical effort of 
workers, technological change often 
demands from workers significantly 
greater intellectual efforts,  as it requires 
their adaptation to new production 
techniques and organisational routines 
(Lazonick, 2009). In certain cases, 
technological change might be so 
disruptive that the capabilities that the 
worker has developed over the years are 
no more useful. This problem may affect 
highly skilled workers more seriously, as 
they will need to make a lot more 
intellectual effort in re-training, if they are 
to maintain the existing standards in their 
material rewards. Organisational change 
might also necessitates significant extra 
intellectual efforts by workers. For 
example, the adoption of flatter 
management structures and lean 
production techniques might increase the 
intellectual efforts required for most jobs. 
The problem is not so much that technical 
or organisational changes might negatively 
affect workers in the short run but how 
these changes are managed. If workers’ 
readiness to change is developed with 
continuous in-work training or if they have 
public support for off-the-job retraining (in 
employment or unemployment), the 
intellectual efforts required to adapt to 
changes are reduced significantly and 
therefore such changes might be, on 
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balance, a source of betterment, rather than 
a threat, for workers.   
The last dimension of work to consider in 
relation to the development process is that 
of intellectual and emotional rewards. The 
‘decent work’ literature has already 
pointed to the importance of providing 
intellectually satisfying jobs, creating a 
sense of involvement by the worker, and 
recognising each worker’s identity 
(Spencer, 2009). However, less emphasis 
has been given to the differences in the 
scope for learning that different types of 
work offer. Workers performing tasks 
offering greater opportunities for 
continuous individual and collective 
learning tend to find their work 
intellectually and emotionally more 
rewarding. As Barrientos et al. (2011, p. 
332) have pointed out, “if economic 
upgrading requires high and consistent 
quality standards that are best provided by 
a stable, skilled and formalised labour 
force, then economic and social upgrading 
may be positively correlated, especially 
when they increase worker productivity”. 
In other words, the production 
transformation of the economy (inter-
sectoral shifts and upgrading within 
sectors) is the most important driver of the 
improvement in job quality, which in turn 
facilitates production transformation. 
 
Making the Sustainable Development 
Goals More Sustainable: policy trade-
off and challenges  
The need to move beyond the currently 
dominant development discourse has been 
gaining recognition, as seen in the United 
Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) agenda. The SDGs offer a 
development agenda that goes beyond 
poverty reduction of the MDGs. In 
particular, Goals 8 and 9 have reintroduced 
employment creation and inclusive and 
sustainable industrialisation, while Goal 10 




However, the SDGs framework still under-
values the central role of production 
transformation and good employment 
generation in sustainable development. 
While a comprehensive assessment of the 
SDGs agenda is beyond the scope of this 
article, an application of our New 
Developmentalist framework reveals some 
critical shortcomings of the agenda.  
First of all, the concept of sustainable 
development in the SDG agenda is mainly 
associated with the idea of environmental 
sustainability (Goals 12, 13, 14 and 15). 
Less emphasis is given to the fact that 
social sustainability requires an increase in 
the number and the quality of jobs, not 
simply the satisfaction of basic needs (e.g., 
education, water, energy; Goals 1 to 7). 
Nor is it fully recognized that economic 
sustainability ultimately depends on 
production transformation. A recent 
network analysis has shown that Goal 9 
(the only Goal explicitly mentioning 
industrialisation) is a pretty marginal node 
in the SDGs network of goals – in other 
words, other goals and targets do not refer 
to Goal 9 very much (Le Blanc, 2014).  
Second, the SGDs framework ignores the 
fact that countries at different stages of  
development face different challenges 
while having different production 
capabilities to address them. This means 
that the relationships between the goals 
related to employment and production 
(Goals 8, 9 and 10), those related to basic 
needs (Goals from 1 to 7), and those 
related to environmental sustainability 
(Goals from 11 to 15) are very much 
context-specific and therefore that each 
country has to identify its own pathway to 
sustainable development.  
Third, and more critically, even when it 
acknowledges the interdependences 
between the goals (and the targets that 
serve them), the SDG agenda neglects 
possible trade-offs among the three groups 
of sustainability goals mentioned above. 
Some of these trade-offs were clearly 
recognized by Amsden (1997, pp. 475-6), 
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when she pointed out: “As for choice of 
industry and technology, modernization 
may be sacrificed for job creation in 
countries with large populations below a 
minimum poverty line. India’s concern 
with equity and unemployment, for 
example, has strongly conditioned its 
industrial targeting policies”. What is 
lacking in the SDG framework is an 
integrated approach in which these trade-
offs are fully spelt out. Below, we 
illustrate how our New Developmentalist 
framework can help us identify and 
reconcile such trade-offs.  
Within the SDGs agenda, the only area in 
which the potential trade-offs are explicitly 
addressed is the one pertaining to the 
relationship between industrial 
development and environmental 
sustainability (Bina, 2013). Here, the 
SDGs implies that industrialisation should 
be pursued only to the extent it is 
environmentally sustainable. However, 
seen from the New Developmentalist 
framework, there are fundamental 
problems  with this view.   
First, even if we prioritise environmental 
sustainability over social and economic 
ones, the way in which the SDGs address 
the problem of green technology transition 
in developing countries is highly 
problematic. This is because the SDGs 
ignore the fact that, without domestic 
industrial capabilities, green transition in 
developing countries will completely 
depend on foreign technologies.  This will 
impose substantial pressure on their trade 
balances, especially if green technologies 
are relatively more expensive. Moreover, 
developing countries may be worse off in 
the long run if they followed the ‘green-
first’ strategy, as it will reduce the 
resources available for the acquisition of 
imported non-energy technologies, which 
can boost domestic manufacturing 




In contrast, an ‘industrialisation-first’ 
strategy, focusing on the development of 
local production systems and technological 
capabilities, could generate greater 
industrial learning and upgrading and 
better sustain the balance of trade. In the 
medium run, it may even enable the 
emergence of domestic green technologies, 
which would make environmental 
sustainability more durable in the long run 
(UNIDO, 2011). 
Moreover, developing countries might not 
even fully benefit from the fruits of their 
green investments under a ‘green-first’ 
strategy. The reason is that an effective use 
of imported green technologies (or, for that 
matter any other imported technology) 
requires the capabilities to identify the 
appropriate technologies mix, to adapt 
them to local conditions, and to operate 
them effectively (Fuso Nerini et al. 2016).  
Finally, certain green technologies might 
not be suitable (for example, in terms of 
power intensity and continuity) for 
countries aspiring to develop energy-
intensive industries, such as iron and steel, 
cement, pulp and paper, aluminum and 
selected chemicals (UNIDO and 
Fraunhofer ISI, 2014). As Amsden’s work 
has shown, some of these industries have 
played a fundamental role in the “rise of 
the rest” and in their “learning to 
industrialise” (Amsden, 2001). The 
heterogeneous energy needs of different 
production sectors suggest that we need to 
advance differentiated greening agendas 
for different countries with different 
production structures.  
Our discussion in this section has shown 
the problems with the conceptualization of 
sustainability in the SDG agenda and the 
potentially unsustainable policies 
recommended by it. This, in turn, 
strengthens our case for a fundamental re-
formulation of the concepts of 
development and sustainability, in which 
production and employment play central 
roles, very much in line with Alice 





Building on Alice Amsden’s legacy, we 
have shown the limitations of today’s 
dominant development discourse, which 
combines Neoclassical economics with the 
CA. We have argued that, despite the 
Neoclassical element being more aware of 
market imperfections than was the ‘hard-
core’ version that had prevailed until the 
1990s and despite the addition of the CA 
element broadening the view of human 
welfare, this discourse is still anchored in 
the individualistic, consumption-oriented 
and exchange-based framework. This 
means the neglect of production, the 
failure to recognize individuals as 
producers who need decent jobs, and the 
neglect of collective capabilities, 
especially but not exclusively productive 
capabilities. The results have been 
development policies that are unable to 
transform the economic structure towards 
high-productivity activities that, directly 
and indirectly, create decent jobs.  
As a corrective to this perspective, this 
article has advanced a New 
Developmentalist framework, which 
emphasizes the central role of production 
and micro-learning dynamics in 
development, while stressing the creation 
of good jobs as the most fundamental 
driver of human development. In order to 
demonstrate how this new framework can 
improve our understanding of development, 
the article has used it to critically examine 
the SDGs agenda. This has allowed us to 
point out the critical need to understand 
the trade-offs between different 
sustainability dimensions – social, 
environmental and economic – and the 
need to reconcile  them in a way that 
allows developing countries to transform 
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i Interestingly, the development problems 
associated with this ‘inter-temporal 
balancing’ and its relationship with the 
choice of production techniques were the 
subjects of Amartya Sen’s PhD thesis in 
Cambridge. Sen (1960) proposed a 
criterion for choice among different 
production techniques which maximises 
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the ‘reinvestable surplus’ yielded by 
investments. 
ii The recent ‘discovery’ by Neoclassical 
economists of the fact that “what you 
export matters” (Hausmann et al., 2007) 
proves the point that the special properties 
of manufacturing industries as engine of 
growth have been (and are still) largely 
under-estimated by Neoclassical 
economics. 
